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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES F. TREES
Plaintiff, Respondent,
vs.

'1

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

'
]1

WALTER M. LEWIS,

No. 19333

1

Defendant, Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The

Respondent

James

F.

Trees

sought

specific

performance on several theories of an agreement to purchase part
of the old Shunesburg Ranch.

Alternativelyf

Respondent sought

damages from his purchase of the remaining 1,067 acres of the
Ranch at Appellant's

insistence, as a condition precedent to

purchasing Appellant's portion of the Ranch.

Appellant claimed

that there had been little more than an outstanding counteroffer,
which

Respondent

had

orally

rejected,

thus

terminating

Respondent's power of acceptance.
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT
An

advisory

jury

empaneled

unanimously found for Respondent.
specifically

adopted

the

jury's

at

Appellant's

request

The Honorable J. Harlan Burns
answers,

entered

consistent findings, and reaffirmed the jury verdict.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent states that Appellant's failure to comply
with Rule 75 (p) (2) (2) (d) U.R.C.P. allows this Court to summarily
assume the correctness of both the jury verdict and trial judgment
below.
several

Respondent also seeks affirmation of the jury verdict on
alternative

grounds.

Appellant has waived

Lastly, Respondent

asserts that

or abandoned his right to an appeal by

accepting Respondent's tender subsequent to trial and voluntarily
vacating the subject matter property.
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment/ or an order
requiring that this matter be retried.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant's statement of the facts fails to comply with
Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d) U.R.C.P.
citation

to

the

record,

Selective and self-serving, with no

it

is contrary

to

the

overwhelming

evidence in this case, the jury verdict, and the judgment and
decree

of

specific

performance.

Consequently,

Respondent

is

compelled by Rule 75(p)(2) U.R.C.P. to independently state the
tacts supporting the same with appropriate citation to the record.
The Respondent James F. Trees obtained a liberal arts
education

from

DePauw

Harvard University.

University,

T138.

and

graduate

degrees

from

In the fall of 1980, he came to Utah

looking for ground aesthetically beautiful and remote upon which
to

conduct

self-sufficient

a

small-scale

farm.

T130.

Utah, Trees was particularly
National Park.

agricultural

operation

and

Being previously acquainted with
interested

in property near Zion

Upon viewing the old Shunesburg Ranch with his

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agent, a Mr. Hogle from Arizona, Trees fell in love with it,
T130; PI.
Historically, Mormon pioneers first developed the eld
Shunesburg Ranch around 1860 at Brigham Young's request that the
headwaters
purposes.

of

the

T557-58.

Virgin

River

be

managed

for

agricultural

Indian ruins on the property evidence earlier

inhabitants, the ancient cliff-dwellers.

Id..

When Trees first

visited Shunesburg, its ownership was in two parties:

the DeMille

family, who originally owned the entire Ranch, and Walter Lewis.
The DeMille parcel, though comprising 1,067 acres, has a dedicated
water

right

described

sufficient

as

a

for only

"rough,

rocky

Appellant himself graciously
hills and rocks".

8.7

acres, and can best be

parcel

of

characterized

property".

T541.

it as "nothing but

First Deposition of Walter Lewis [hereinafter

1DWL] at 42. The cross-hatched area on PI shows the remaining 160
acres

of

T41-42.

the

old

Shunesburg

Ranch

then

owned

by Appellant.

Abutted to the east and north by Zion National Park and

surrounded

by

federeil ground,

this

property

consists

of

two

separate pieces, one being the entryway into the old Shunesburg
Ranch, and the other comprising the main farm on the far east
side.

Containing 90% of the arable land and a vast majority of

the water right, Appellant described it as the "heart" of the
Ranch.

1DWL at 42; T41.

This property also had a habitable

residence with an adjoining guest house.
counsel

refers

"mansion", the

to

still

"mansion",

another
as

such,

T556.

"home"
is

While Appellant's

as

little

uninhabitable "relic" in the words of his client.

the
more

than

an

T556-57; Second

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Shunesburg

Deposition

of

Walter

Lewis

[hereinafter

2DWL]

at

120, cf.

Appellant's Brief [hereinafter AB] at 2.
In 1980, Appellant
Illinois.

resided

in a suburb of Chicago,

President of Stereo Optical Company, he was a man of

considerable education, with an advanced degree in accounting,
training

in civil engineering, and a doctorate

T40-42, 109.

in optometry.

Having acquired the Utah ranch seven years earlier,

Appellant had only been able to spend some weeks in the summer and
a few Christmases there. T555.
During this time, Appellant often indicated that if he
sold the property, he would want a buyer with lots of money who
did not know what to do with it.

T490, 559-60.

When Trees

requested to visit the property in 1980, Lewis consented.

T563.

And, while Trees continued to be represented by Mr. Hogle, Lewis
was being contacted by a local agent, Mr. Milne.

While Appellant

indicates that Trees hired Milne to acquire an option on the
property, at trial, Milne's agency
unproven.

for either party remained

Se<e AB at 3; cf:. Finding of Fact [hereinafter F] 7.
After visiting the property, Milne advised Lewis that

Trees and Hogle were pur suing

the property, and the parties

arranged for a meeting in Chicago.

T563-64.

Lewis

descriptions

arrived

prepared

with

maps,

At this meeting,
of

the water

rights, and several slides of the ranch specifically to increase
Trees' interest in the property.

T564-65. Trees then asked Lewis

if he could look at the ranch once more, and Lewis subsequently
decided that he would meet Trees at the ranch.

T565; 1DWL14.
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At this later meeting, Mr. Hatch, an agent for Mr.
Milne, brought an appraisal requested by Lewis showing a total
value his portion of the old Shunesburg Ranch as being $230,000.
Early discussions regarding a deferred purchase price with 8%
interest were entertained.

T577.

While nowhere mentioned in his

brief, Appellant then also revealed

that he had

less than a

neighborly relationship with the DeMilles, who Appellant claimed
had tried to steal some of his water.

2DWL131-32.

And, through

extensive negotiations regarding the purchase of the Lewis ranch,
Appellant remained adamant that Trees should first be able to
acquire the DeMille property.

See Fl, 2; T89-90, 593-94; P23. At

this meeting, the potential of deeding Lewis1 property to EYU and
having Trees then purchase it with an annuity back to Lewis was
also discussed.

After Lewis met with Mr. Kimber Ricks of BYU,

Lewis rejected it as economically unattractive.

Appellant also

indicated desires to retain some visitation to the ranch, with
which

Trees was perfectly

comfortable.

T567-68.

Suggestions

pertaining to Lewis1 retention of the habitable home for sixty
days with a perennial lease to Trees for ten months each year and
a purchase option upon Lewis1 demise were also discussed.

T570.

Ultimately, Lewis indicated that by reason of his wife's ill
health, it would be more convenient to him to occasionally stay
overnight, and that he would build another, more accessible home
nearly on property he also owned.

T509-10, 560.

Lewis

to

persisted

that

his

desires

retain

Nonetheless,

some

rights

of

visitation would be more comfortably accommodated if the DeMilles
were first removed from Shunesburg. T593-94.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Early

on

Appellant

professionals,

including

negotiations.

T568,

offer

of

$230,000

an

advice

attorney,

578-80.
as

sought

in

from

reference

to

these

rejected Trees1

After Appellant

insufficiently

several

attractive,

Trees

then

increased his net purchase price to $270,000 and the interest rate
to

14%.

T584-85.

Appellant,

then

negotiations with Trees, communicated
accept this offer.

T585-86.

feeling

good

about

his

to Trees that he would

Because both parties now desired to

unify the ranch under Trees' ownership, they decided that Trees
would

take

an

"option"

on

the

Lewis

property,

potential ability to acquire the DeMille parcel.

pending

his

See F2; T131,

370.
Appellant then phoned Trees on the 3rd of December.
T594.

During this conversation, Trees suggested that he could

stable Appellant's horse on the property to facilitate Appellant's
enjoyment of his visitation rights. T594-95. Mr. Steven E. Snow,
Trees' attorney and attorney-in-fact, then drafted the real estate
option, P5, and Mr. Hatch took it to Chicago for Appellant's
signature.

T317.

Hatch, as an agent of Milne, also took a

listing agreement which, as executed by Lewis, indicated a gross
purchase price of

$300,000, with

divided between Hogle and Milne.

a

$30,000

commission

to be

T513; P54; F5.

Though Trees was familiar with the essentials of P5,
Snow had reviewed it with him only orally and it had not been read
to him.

T142-43.

By oversight, Snow initially failed to include

a visitation provision in the original document.
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T313. Prior to

executing

P5, however, two handwritten

Appellant's request.

changes were

made

at

T46-47, 586-87, F6. One change regarded tax

ramifications upon the occurrence of accelerated payments, and
neither party claimed any materiality regarding it.

See F8. The

latter change drafted by Appellant as an addendum on page 4 of P5
became the focal point of Appellant's case.

It states as follows:

"Additionally, it is understood that there exists an agreement
between optionee and optionor for mutually agreeable visitation
rights for optionor."
Hatch telephoned Trees regarding the change, and as this
provision reflected a then existing agreement of which Trees was
fully aware, he said it was fine.

T49, 131, 151-52.

Indeed, the

trial court specifically found that both parties understood the
terms of Appellant's retained visitation prior to Appellant's
executing P5, and beyond that, that the agreement itself otherwise
accurately described the property and the negotiated terms of
sale, including price, manner of payment and security therefor.
See F10, 55; T78.

In

reference

to

his

addendum, Appellant

testified that when it was made he knew what visitation rights had
been agreed to, and that the agreement then existed between the
parties.

T613-14, 617. Similarly, the trial court found that the

addendum

evidenced

an

existing

accepted by both parties.

oral

understanding

shared

and

See F7.

Three other negotiated provisions were material to the
parties'

agreement.

First, P5, "the

option"

provided

for a

thirty-day closing period after exercise for the preparation of
final documents of transfer and retention of security in reference
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to

the

proposed

sale.

F10; P5

at

18.

Secondly, Appellant

conceded that he negotiated and set forth the only manner in which
Mr. Trees could exercise "the option".
Trees could exercise only

T81, 85-86.

As required,

...

[b]y depositing in the U. S. mail, postage prepaid,
written notice to optionor of exercise, addressed to
optionor accompanied by Thirty-Four Thousand Dollars
($34,000.00) in lawful money of the United States, cash,
cashier's check or money order. Said notice must be
given on or before December 31, 1980. See P5 at S[5;
F10; T88.
Lastly, due to Trees' anticipated expense in acquiring the DeMille
parcel,

the

parties

separately

negotiated

a

provision

which

specifically required Appellant to notify Respondent in writing of
any

perceived

agreement

and

failure
allow

to

perform

Respondent

an

pursuant

to

opportunity

the
to

parties'
cure.

As

specifically set forth in paragraph 11 of P5:
Should optionee fail to comply with any of the terms
hereof, optionor shall give optionee written notice
giving particulars in which optionee is in default, and
should optionee fail to cure such default within ten
(10) days of mailing of said notice, this contract shall
be terminated without further act of either party. See
Fll, T382-83.
The above provision was uniquely important to Trees, insofar as he
anticipated spending close to $600,000 in acquiring the DeMille
property.

Noteworthy, in reviewing the parties' negotiations and

their total agreement, the trial court found that the parties
intended that paragraph 11 of P5, the December 4th, 1980 document
. . . would be employed to resolve any disputes between
them and would allow Defendant an opportunity to specify
with particularity whatever problems he might have as to
any tender or variance in the performance of Plaintiff,
and on the other hand, would allow Plaintiff, upon
receipt of such notice, an opportunity to cure any
claimed default. See F53.
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Two days after executing P5, Appellant copied to Trees a
letter mailed to the Superintendent of Zion National Park.

In

that letter Appellant indicated that Respondent had an option and
would

take over ownership at the end of the year, but that

Appellant would maintain some involvement and part-time residency
during

his

lifetime.

consistent with
T306.

P12.

Trees

his understanding

testified

that

this

the parties1

of

agreement.

Immediately after the Appellant's execution of P-5, Trees

authorized

the

issuance

of a check

for

$1,000

to hold

document open through December for Trees1 acceptance.
Appellant received this check on December 9th, 1980.
P9.

was

that

T132-33.

T46-47; F9;

A cover letter accompanying the check contained the following

simple statement:
Enclosed please find check for $1,000.00 as option
deposit from Mr. James F. Trees as per agreement. P8.
On December

17th, 1980, Appellant sent a letter and

enclosure to Mr. Hatch in St. George, the real estate agent who
had earlier gone to Chicago.

In this letter Lewis indicated that,

though not concerned, he thought "it would be wise to put a
statement in writing as to the 'agreement' mentioned at the close
of

the

option

enclosure,

document".

marked

as

P14.

P15,

did

Lewis
not

testified
change

that

the

the

existing

understanding of the parties, but simply memorialized the same.
T49-50, 628-29.
agreement

with

Similarly, Trees testified that he was 100% in
the

language

set

forth

in

P15.

T268.

Commensurately, the trial court found that P15, as drafted by
Appellant, merely clarified the details of the then existing oral
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agreement referred to in P5.

And, while P15 on its face required

the separate physical signature of Trees, Appellant testified that
it was not material to him, so long as Trees would sign P15 during
the

option's

closing

period.

T122;

2DWL

at

Consequently, the trial court also found that

50;

P5

at

18.

...

it was not material to Defendant so long as Plaintiff
agreed to the terms of the writing [P15] and would
execute the same during the closing period for the
purchase of the property. F22.
Appellant's

only

concern

at

this

time

was

that

if

Respondent predeceased him after exercise, Appellant would have to
deal with another party.

T624.

The trial court incorporated P15

verbatim in both the decree and the recorded documents pertaining
to specific performance.

See Record, Volume 3 [hereinafter R3] at

30-31, 38; P59 and 60, Supplemental Record filed June, 1984.
A
subsequent

series of stipulations now becomes material to the
recitation

of

facts.

Under

Higlee

v.

McDonald,

No. 18755, filed April 27th, 1984, they are conclusive and binding
on the parties, preclude the adoption of conflicting findings, and
should be of particular interest to this Court:
(1)

[B]oth parties stipulated that the December
17th enclosure (P15) was part and parcel of the
December 4 document entitled real estate option
(P5), insofar as it clarified the addendum thereto,
and both Plaintiff and Defendant further stipulated
that it accurately and adequately set forth their
agreement pertaining to visitation. F20; see also
T*12/8/82-12/9/82; T136.

(2)

[D]efendant granted three written extensions of P5
and Pi5; thus, these instruments, taken together,
were held open until May 30th, 1981 by Defendant
for acceptance by Plaintiff. F25.

(3)

[R]egardless of whether the December 4th, 1980
document entitled real estate option as clarified
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by the December 17th, 1980 memorialization was an
option or a counteroffer, the same was held out by
the Defendant
for the Plaintiff's
acceptance
through May 30th, 1981, T346-47, F29.
(4)

Plaintiff tendered orally and in writing to pay the
amount of money required by the documents, with
agreed credit for amounts previously received by
the Defendant for extensions.
(T 12/8/82-12/9/82;
T347.

(5)

From and after the 30th of May, 1981, the Defendant
did at no time notify Mr. Trees specifying any
defect
or
failure
in Mr. Trees' tender
or
performance. T136, 410-12.

(6)

Defendant further stipulated that concurrently the
Plaintiff was not in default in any particular in
his obligations from December 4th, 1980 up through
and including May 30th, 1981, which proposition the
court specifically accepted. F14.

(7)

Lastly, at trial the parties stipulated that P5 and
P15 were to be considered together as but one
document and treated as the same. F17.

Exhibit P15 as mailed to Hatch by Lewis was subsequently
left by Hatch at the St. George offices of attorney Snow.

F24.

Until May 27th, 1981, Lewis never inquired of anyone about P15,
and indeed, despite "abundant opportunity", would speak to neither
Hatch nor Trees about the same.
informed of P15.
engrossed

in

F26.

Meanwhile, Trees was not

By mid-December, 1980, Trees, in good faith, was

immediate

negotiations

initially were not fruitful.

with

the

DeMilles

which

F25.

As previously stated, whether denominated as an "option"
or "counteroffer", Appellant's offer to sell remained open through
May 30th, 1981, by reason of three written extensions for which,
in part, $1,500 was paid as consideration to be credited toward
"exercising the option".

F25.

Trees' frequent reports that he

was having difficulty closing with the DeMilles were the basis for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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each extension.

T52-53.

With each request for an extension,

Respondent would personally contact Appellant, after which would
follow a call to Appellant by Respondent's attorney, Mr. Snow.
F25.

On other occasions, Trees simply called Appellant to discuss

problems

he was having

with

the DeMilles

concerning

rights, access, or negotiations regarding price.

mineral

To encourage the

DeMilles to sell, Appellant told them that if they would sell he
had an option agreement that would doubtless be exercised, and
that he would sell also.

T632.

Unbeknownst to Trees, however,

Appellant had also been contacted through Dale Docksteader, yet
another

real

property.

estate

agent, by

Robert

In late March, Appellant

Redford.

T624-25.

Redford

finally

regarding

the

told Trees about

Meanwhile, pending Respondent's solving his

problems with the DeMilles, Appellant covertly felt that P15 was
concededly unimportant.

T352; see Answer to Interrogatory No. 55,

Rl at 352.
The trial court found that in each extension granted by
Appellant

...
the words used by the parties in reference to the nature
of their agreement were "The Option" and in Defendant's
[Appellant's] mind the word "option" referred to the
December 4th and 17th documents [P5, P15], which taken
together comprised
in their entirety Defendant's
proposal to sell the property. F27.

During

the

same period

of time, the DeMilles

also

spoke to

Appellant, who was well aware of Trees' difficulty with them.
T589.

As Trees became concerned about losing Appellant's property

to Mr. Redford, Appellant became increasingly impatient due to
Trees'

failure

to

reach

an

agreement

with
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the DeMilles and

exercise "the option".

T25, 591-92.

Ultimately, Snow proposed

that Trees exercise the option prior to reaching an agreement with
the DeMilles, but Appellant was again adamant that Trees not
exercise

the

option

absent

this

condition.

T382,

593.

As

Appellant specifically stated in his last extension:
I, Walter M. Lewis, hereby extend the option of
Nov. 1980 for another 30 days.
As my part is dependent on Jim's first being able
to acquire the DeMille property, I don't know how else
we could do this—but extensions cannot of course go on
indefinitely as there is a considerable financial loss
involved for me each time. Sincerely, /s/ Walter M.
Lewis P23.
It was conceded by Lewis at trial that even though P23
refers to a November, 1980 option, Appellant's intended reference
was to P5.

F28; T54.

Clearly, however, Lewis1 sale depended on

Trees first being able to acquire the DeMille property. T54.
Appellant conceded that during the spring of 1981 he had
at least five conversations with Trees.
figure

at

closer

conversations

with

to

ten.

Snow.

T291.
Several

TG19.

Appellant
of

the

Trees placed the
had

additional

problems

with

the

DeMilles were amplified upon, and other matters, including mineral
rights, a potential location for Trees' post office box, and
maximization of access to the Ranch by constructing a bridge were
discussed.

T291-92,

321-23;

see

also

F25.

Despite

these

conversations, however, Appellant never spoke to Hatch or Trees
about P15, the December 17th memorandum, until late May of 1981,
despite abundant opportunities to do so! F26. While the evidence
conflicted

regarding

the

substance

of

conversations

between

Appellant and attorney Snow during this period, the trial court,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nonetheless, found that no issue of importance ever arose between
the parties on or before May 27th, 1981. Id.
On May 26th, 1981, after a substantial expenditure of
time and attorney's

fees, and

in conformity with Appellant's

demand that Trees first be able to acquire the DeMille property,
Trees successfully completed his negotiations with the DeMilles.
See F30; T251-60, 276, 278-79, 327-30.

Thus, on that date,

subject only to Trees' proceeding in good faith to close, his
transaction with the DeMilles had been successfully culminated,
and Trees' ability to close with the DeMilles was never raised as
an issue.

See F31 and 32.

Despite an appraisal indicating that

the DeMille property alone had a value of only $613,000, Trees
ultimately paid $846,000 to acquire it.

See P58; £f. T136-38.

On May 27th, 1981, Trees excitedly phoned Appellant to
report that he had successfully completed his negotiations with
the

DeMilles.

T309-10.

Appellant

now

characterizes

this

conversation as Respondent's oral rejection of his "counteroffer",
a term which Appellant first conceived at the insistence of his
attorney seme two weeks later.

T613? 2DWL at 87, 109; AB 5, 7-8.

The thrust of this conversation, if closely scrutinized, however,
rejected nothing, and instead evidenced Trees' firm commitment to
comply with the parties' bargain.

See F33.

Trees related the

conversation on pages 279-81 of the transcript as follows:
I called Walter. I was feeling quite good, because we
had many discussions over the past previous two or three
months. He was aware that I was trying to settle this
dispute with the DeMilles. In fact he gave me some
suggestions about it. . . I probably said something
like, "Good morning, Walter." I said I was really happy
and I thought he would be very happy. And I said, "I
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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settled the DeMille situation. I am able to close on
it." And he [Mr. Lewis] went blank; there was a silence
and he still didn't say anything. And that felt very
weird to roe because we had been having very warm
conversations over the previous months. So I thought
maybe he was upset because (Objection by Mr. Bell) . . .
I next said, "Well, Walter, I know you wanted the
initial payment split in two tax years to save taxes."
And I said, "Because of the delays that, you know, no
longer applies, I'll be happy to do that for you the
next year," if that was what he was upset about.
Trees then explained that in late December, the payment schedule
allowed Appellant to spread the initial income over two tax years,
and that Trees was willing to do that if a May exercise was
otherwise problematic to Lewis.

T281-82. Trees then continued:

Then there was kind of a silence and then he said
something like, and he was kinda hot, and he said,
"Where is the write-up of my sixty-day write-up," or
something like that. T283.
At this point in time Trees thought Lewis may have been referring
to the old lease, as he had never in fact heard of P15 at that
time and did not know what Lewis was talking about.

T172, 217.

Trees continued as follows:
I was a little stunned. I didn't know what he was
talking about. And I said, "Walter, what do you mean?"
And he said, "Where is the write-up of my sixty
write-up." Ke did it again in a very angry tone, which
I had not heard from him before. And I said, "Walter,
what do you mean. You have no write-up of sixty-day
rights?" And he blurted out, "You call Mike Hatch. He
knows all about it." And I said, "Walter, I will. Calm
down. Let me find out and I'll call Mike Hatch and get
right back to you." (T282-83)
This May 27th conversation ended on a very interesting
note.

Trees testified to its conclusion as follows:
Lewis: "Oh, yeah, . . . if you think that the DeMilles
have given you a hard time, you haven't seen nothing
yet."
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Trees: "Walter, I'll call Mike Hatch. Just calm down.
I'll be right back to you. Whatever our agreement is
I'll honor it. I'll get. right back to you." T283.
Standing

alone,

the

above

commentary

may

appear

remarkably

self-serving, but Lewis also confirmed this ending to the parties'
conversation.

Thus,

Appellant,

upon

cross-examination,

reluctantly conceded that Trees reaffirmed on the 27th of May that
he [Trees] would honor his commitments, which Lewis also stated at
his deposition.
Lewis

also

T641; 2DWL at 14;7; see also F34.

conceded

that he angrily

told Trees

Furthermore,

that

if Trees

thought the DeMilles had given him trouble, that he hadn't seen
anything yet because he
T649-50; 2DWL at 125.

[Lewis] would be a more

stubborn foe.

Importantly, from and after May 27th, 1981,

Appellant took a position resisting the sale, and regardless of
what Trees did or tendered, Appellant would not close.
at 29-30; 2DWL 110, 125; T213, 650.

T 4/1/83

Indeed, after May 27th, Trees

never understood why Lewis would not close, and Lewis would never
explain why.
Mr.

Bell

resisted

T612.

following
any

Lewis conceded that he initially contacted
this

further

conversation,

pursuit

of

the

and

that

matter.

thereafter

he

T601-03, 642.

Appellant evasively then told Snow that he was simply not happy
with the transaction.
lost faith.

T-387.

He told Trees that he had simply

Often he was simply silent.

Regardless, the trial

court found that after May 27th, 1981 there was not . . .
anything that James Trees could have done to bring about
a satisfactory consummation of it, from the proof . . .
[the trial judge] heard. (T 4/1/83 at 28-29; T213.
Immediately
Lewis'

after

conversing

instruction, phoned Hatch.

with

Trees,

at

Hatch, in turn, then phoned

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

Lewis,

Lewis, and Trees, at Hatch's direction, then contacted Snow, who
though previously not aware of the contents of P15, now studied it
very carefully.

T358-59, 417, 600.

On May 28th, 1981, Trees again phoned Snow who advised
Trees that P15 comported with the parties1 agreement.

T238; F36.

As Jim Trees was then in Sagaponack, New York, on May 29th, 1983
he again phoned Snow to obtain instructions on how to exercise

?:

"the option11, having decided to accept both P5 and P15 as drafted*

-'f ^

T184, 146-47.

Snow then dictated to Trees the letter mailed bn.6

pursuant to paragraph 11 of P5.

T147, 424-25; P24.

A cashier's Mite

check for $32,500 was also tendered as required for exercise with
credit for the $1,500 previously received by Lewis.

Id., P25.

P24, addressed to Walter Lewis and timely mailed on May 29th,
1981, states in pertinent part as follows:
Dear Walter:
In accordance with the terms of our
contract, and the extensions hereof, I hereby exercise
my option to purchase the property in Utah.
Sincerely, James F. Trees.
: n r
Again,

regardless

of

the

content

of

the

May

27th,

1981

conversation, both parties stipulated that whether Lewis' offer be
characterized as an option or a counteroffer, the same was left
open for acceptance through May 30th, 1981.

Sufrra at 10-11.

And

while Trees used the words "the option" in referring to both P5
and P15, as did Appellant, the trial court did not find the letter
itself unambiguous.
ambiguity,

Trees

See e.g., T 4/14/83 at 5.

testified

that

this

letter

Clarifying any
was

meant

to

incorporate both P5 and P15, treating the same as one dbcuMent, to
which the parties stipulated.

T145, 147-48, 211-12, 214, 222;
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-

supra at 10-11; see also T376-78, 428-29, 669, 470.

The trial

court, adopting the jury's findings, also found that regardless of
the documents1 nomenclature, that is, whether denominated together
as an option or counteroffer, that Respondent, by his letter and
tendered cashier's check, did accept any and all counteroffers,
options or proposals in whatever form had been submitted by both
P5 and P15.

(See F13, 19, 29, 44; T 4/1/83 at 29-30)

has withdrawn this tender.

Trees never

See F44, 45.

FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT
Shortly after P24 and P25 were mailed on May 29th, 1983,
and prior to withdrawing Appellant's offer, Appellant received
them.

T94-F49.

Though the tender was consistent with the terms

of the parties' agreement, Lewis, nonetheless, advised several
people,

including

transaction.

Trees, that he would

no

T209, 376, 477, 635, 642; P24.

longer

close

the

Subsequently, Trees

actively explored what Lewis wanted, with Lewis himself conceding
that

Trees

even

begged

him

what

additional

required as a condition precedent to closing.

performance

was

See T136-37.

A

perusal of Lewis' deposition reveals the following:
Q: (By Mr. Hughes) After May 28th, do you recall Mr.
Trees at any time saying words to the effect that
"Walter [Mr. Lewis], please tell me what you want, put
in writing what you want so I can comply"?
A:
(By Mr. Lewis) As time went on, he said that
several times. (2DWL at 93-94)
Though Trees tried to close several times saying he
would

sign

response,

any
never

additional
told

or

document
wrote

Lewis

Trees

wanted,

how

insufficient and stubbornly refused to close.

his

tender

was

T107, 127, 209,
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Lewis, in

635-36.
condition

Thus, Trees never knew what else Lewis desired as a
precedent

to

closing.

T136-37.

The

trial

court

similarly found that though Appellant kept Trees' tender for two
weeks, neither Appellant nor his agents ever objected to its
sufficiency or nature.

See F49-52.

The trial court further found

that even beyond the obvious statutory proscriptions regarding
tender, Appellant should have contractually employed paragraph 11
of P5 to resolve any problem he might have had with Trees'
performance.

See F3.

Finally, on June 12th, Appellant overtly took a "new
position", refusing Trees' performance and shutting the door on
the transaction.

2DWL at 110, P26.

Communicated by Appellant's

attorney's letter, this was the first written communication from
Lewis to Trees after May 29th.

P26; T644.

In that letter, Mr.

Bell used the word "counteroffer" in reference to P5 and P15 for
the first time.

T613; 2DWL at 109. Mr. Bell also suggested these

words to Lewis, even though Lewis had previously referred to both
documents as "the option".

See 2DWL at 87.

On June 13th, over

two weeks after Trees' tender, Appellant returned it, without
comment or clarification.

See F56; P27.

ATTEMPTED SETTLEMENT
A few days later Lewis advised both Milne and Trees that
his lawyer, Mr. Bell, had found P15 unacceptable.
209, 391, 393, 483.

T162, 188-89,

In settlement discussions with Lewis, several

proposals drafted by Mr. Milne were submitted.

T209, 482. Though

not exactly what Trees had agreed to as set forth in PI5, Trees
authorized Snow to execute these proposals, as Lewis had indicated
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to Milne and Trees that they might be acceptable to him. T206-09,
162f

188-89, 391, 393, 402; P28, 29.

rejected

Ultimately, Lewis also

these proposals generated by Milne.

During closing,

Lewis truly felt that he had fulfilled his promise of May 27th
that he would give Trees more problems that the DeMilles and be a
truly harsh opponent.

T650-51; 2DWL at 125.
TRIAL

At trial the issues were whether P5 and P15 comprised an
option or a counteroffer, and whether Respondent had accepted the
same.
his

See F77. Though Mr. Bell appeared openly dissatisfied with
client's

counteroffer.

testimony,

the

jury,

T647-48; F39, 40.

The

nonetheless,

found

a

jury, however, further

unanimously held that Jim Trees had accepted the same.

(F39, 40)

While

and

the

trial

judge

subjectively

felt

that

P5

P15

constituted an option; regardless, he found the evidence clear and
convincing that in either event Trees had timely accepted the
same.
that

See T 4/1/83 at 14; F40.
the

parties1

minds

had

The trial court further found

met,

and

that

despite

Trees1

substantial tender, Lewis never notified Trees of any default or
insufficiency in Trees' performance.
Regarding

attorney's

See F40, 43, 46.

fees,

the

trial

court

awarded

Respondent $45,000 after extensive testimony and briefing on the
issue.

See F60, 62; T698-729; R3 at 90, 107.

The trial court

dismissed prima facie Respondent's alternative cause of action for
economic losses suffered in purchasing the DeMille property.
Conclusion of Law No. 10.
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See

POST-TRIAL CLOSING
The

trial

closing date.

court

established

R4 at 39-43.

June

17th, 1983f

as a

A deed and mortgage were subsequently

recorded recognizing Appellant's agreed right of visitation. P59,
60; Supp. Record filed 6/84.
delivered to Appellant.

Trees' original mortgage note was

R4 at 36, 43.

In early June of 1983, Appellant's counsel notified both
Respondent
premises.

and

his

counsel

that

Appellant

was

vacating

the

See Affidavit of James F. Trees filed 9/27/83, 5s 3-5.

On June 17th, 1983, Respondent began peacefully residing there.
Id.

Trees has now tendered two checks for $70/000 in conformity

with the mortgage note and judicial decree.

Despite his July,

1983 appeal, Lewis subsequently cashed these checks.

Id., all §s

with exhibits; see also 75(h) U.R.C.P. order amending record filed
6/84.

No supersedeas bond has been filed.

A third $28,000 check

has also been sent to Appellant.
POINT I
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW COMPEL THE
AFFIRMATION OF THE ADVISORY JURY'S VERDICT AS CONCURRED
IN BY THE TRIAL COURT
A.
Under Utah law, the Supreme Court does
not reverse unless the evidence clearly preponderates
against the Findings of the trial court.
Respondent

sought

specific

contract to convey real estate.
determined

from

a

thorough

performance

a written

A contract's commitments are

examination

pertaining to its execution and formation.
584 P.2d 878 (Utah 1978).

of

of

the

circumstances

See Otteson v. Malone,

While Respondent concedes that specific

performance of oral contracts may require a greater degree of
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certainty, regardless, the same burden of proof does not follow
the trial court decision on appeal as Appellant suggests.

See,

e.g., Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); cf. Pitcher v.
Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (Utah 1967); AB at 9-10.

Thus, the Utah

Supreme Court unanimously holds that even where the level of proof
at

trial

is

clear

and

convincing,

the

appellate

court,

nonetheless, applies the "clearly preponderates standard".
Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984).

See

Under this standard,

the Supreme Court does not reverse the trial court's judgment,
unless the evidence in the case clearly preponderates against its
findings.
1981).

Id.; see also Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah

Indeed, applying the "clearly preponderates standard", the

Supreme Court reviews the record, looking for any "reasonable
basis in the evidence" to justify the trial court's findings. See
Parks Enterprises, Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918
(Utah 1982); Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980);
and Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980).
Respondent cites the above because Appellant theorizes
that Respondent failed to meet his burden of proof.

Appellant's

contentions, however, ignore overwhelming evidence which compelled
the opposite conclusion of both the jury and the district court
below, as if to invoke a retrial of the matter on appeal.
logical

standards

of

review

court's

judgment, even

compel

in equity

affirmation

cases, unless

clearly preponderates against those findings.
will

ultimately

"assume

that

the

of

trial

the trial

the

evidence

Indeed, this Court

judge

believed
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Thus,

those

aspects of the evidence which support his findings and judgment."
See Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982).
B.
In the instant case the Supreme Court
summarily assume the correctness of the trial judgment.
Rule

75(p)(2)(2)(d)

U.R.C.P.

should

states that Appellant's

brief shall contain "a concise statement of the material facts of
the

case

citing

statement." (Id.)

the

pages

of

the

record

supporting

such

On appeal, Appellant's version of "the facts"

contains no citation whatsoever to the record or transcript.

As

such, it is clearly not responsive to the purpose and intent of
Rule 75.

See Harmston v. Harmston, No. 19297, filed April 10th,

1984; and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982).

Indeed,

Appellant's entire brief contains only four or five selective
references

to

the

trial

transcript.

Ultimately,

Appellant's

failure to comply with Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d) U.R.C.P. allows that
this Court will logically assume the correctness of the trial
court's judgment, rather than, like Alice, pursue the hare in
search of grounds for reversal.

As stated by Justice Durham in

State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983):
This Court will assume the correctness of the judgment
below if counsel on appeal does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, as to making a concise statement of facts and
citation of the pages in the record where they are
supported. Id.., citing State v. Tucker, supra; see also
Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297
(1952).
Indeed,

in

asserting

his

theory

of

the

lawsuit,

Appellant

characterizes as "the facts" allegations which not only are bereft
of any proper citation, but are also contrary to the trial court's
findings.

In effect, by failing to specify where the findings
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lack support in the evidence, and asserting "facts" contrary to
those found by the trial court, Appellant creates such confusion
that his appeal, logically, should not be considered at all.

See

e.g., Utah-Idaho Sugar Company v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 491,
210 P. 106 (1922).
POINT II
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED ALL OPTIONS,
OFFERS OR COUNTEROFFERS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR
NOMENCLATURE, IS CLEARLY SUSTAINABLE ON APPEAL
Point I of Appellant's brief states that the trial court
should

have

counteroffer.

found
AB

counteroffer, the
answer

to

a

that
at

I.

trial

specific

Respondent
In

never

finding

court

Respondent

confirmed

interrogatory,

accepted

and

the

Appellant's
accepted

the

jury's unanimous

further

found that,

regardless of the nomenclature applied to P5 and P15, "offer",
"option", or "counteroffer", that Respondent accepted the same
absent variation and within the prescribed time limits.

See F13,

19, 27, 40, 42 and 45.
Summarizing Appellant's argument, he states that Trees
rejected the counteroffer and failed to physically sign either the
December 5th or the December 17th documents.

AB at 7.

He then

selectively excerpts a portion of the May 27th conversation and
construes it as being an oral rejection of the outstanding offer.
AB at 7-8.
Trees'

Appellant argues that this "oral rejection" terminated

power

to

accept

the offer.

Simultaneously, Appellant

magnanimously indicates that he would have probably continued with
the transaction after May 27th, had Respondent reaffirmed his
commitments to the Appellant.

AB at 8.

Lastly, Appellant argues
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that Respondent's May 29th letter should have clearly indicated
that

he

was

"option".

accepting

a

"counteroffer",

not

exercising

an

Id.
Analyzing

the

above

contentions,

Respondent

first

reasserts that both the jury and the trial judge found that he had
accepted

all

outstanding

offers,

counteroffers,

options

or

proposals, without variance, and that he did so by his tender on
May

29th,

1981.

requirements,

See

Utah

Regarding
seem

pertaining

to

signature

oblivious

to

integration

of

Trees was in Sagaponik, New York at the time of the

exercise,

legally

arguments

doctrine

exercise of P5 and P15.
Trees'

45; P24, 25.

Appellant's

well-established
instruments.

F19,

by

The latter two exhibits were in Utah.

letter

and

signed both P5 and P15.

accompanying
P24, 25.

check,

in

effect

Trees' letter, P24,

clearly states as follows:
Dear Walter:
In accordance with the terms of our
contract, and the extensions thereof, I hereby exercise
my option to purchase the property in Utah.
Parole

evidence

clearly

established

Appellant Lewis in referring
option".

See F27.

that

the

words

used

to Exhibits P5 and P15 were

by
"the

Similarly, Respondent Trees testified that his

intention in exercising "the option" was to be bound by both P5
and P15.

Supra at 17-18.

Indeed, both parties stipulated that P5

and PI5 were to be considered
trial,

and

this

stipulation

as one document

becomes

no

less

for purposes of
binding

Appellant because it is to his disadvantage on appeal.

upon

See, e.g.,

Higlee v. McDonald, No. 18755, filed April 27th, 1984.
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the

Indeed,

these two documents are the only ones upon which the Appellant, as
signator, could be charged.
The trial court did not find P24 unambiguous.
at 5.

With

considered

T 4/14/83

some inherent ambiguity, the trial court

evidence

extrinsic

to P24 to delineate

properly

Respondent's

intent and the enforceability of his contractual obligations.
Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271
P.2d
(Utah

1374

See

(Utah 1982); Reed v. Alvey, 610

(Utah 1980); see also Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d

1980) .

decisions,

Indeed, the principle of the Hackford

supra, has

been

a

long-standing

one

in

427

and Alvey
Utah

law,

particularly in Plaintiffs1 suits for specific performance.

See,

e.g., Keir v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970); and
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261 at 266, 501 P.2d
266 at 270 (1972).
Clearly, Utah precedent allows that a separate writing
may satisfy the signature requirements of the Statute of Frauds,
so long as some nexus between the writings is shown.

Further,

[t]his requirement may be satisfied either by express
reference in the signed writing to the unsigned one, or
by implied reference gleaned from the contents of the
writings
and
the
circumstances
surrounding
the
transaction. In the latter instance, parole evidence may
be used to connect an unsigned document to one that has
been signed by the person to be charged. See Gregerson
v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980); see also Peterson
v. Hendrick, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974); and Miller v.
Hancock, 67 Utah 202, 246 P. 949 (1926).
Trees' testimony that he intended to accept both P5 and P15 was
overwhelming.

The jury so found.

The terms used by Trees were

exactly those terms which Appellant himself chose to use.
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See

F27.

As

a

matter

of

law,

Trees

signed

both

P5

and P15.

Gregerson, supra.
Appellant's

argument

that

Trees

on May

27th orally

terminated any option or offer extended to purchase the property
further ignores the stipulation that P5 and P15 were left open for
Respondent's acceptance until May 30th, 1981.
supra at

10-11.

Appellant.

Indeed, it is this

See AB at 8; cf.

stipulation which binds

Appellant's position that Trees orally rejected the

outstanding offer is further repudiated by both parties' testimony
that Trees concluded the conversation reaffirming his intent to
honor all of his commitments to Appellant.

Supra at 15-16.

It is

further to be noted that Trees' completed negotiations on the
DeMille property alone were sufficient consideration to hold the
documents open for acceptance until May 30th, 1981.
context,

Lewis1

argument

that

a

disputed

oral

In such a
conversation

effectively terminated Trees' ability to accept the offer three
days prior to its termination must fail.

Indeed, in light of his

stipulation, Appellant can hardly ask this Court to find that his
offer terminated on May 27th.
Prior Utah cases hold that a noncompliant acceptance of
an outstanding offer does not, in itself, terminate the offer if
other consideration binds the offeror to contractually hold the
offer open.
at

1288

See J. R. Stone Company, Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285

(Utah

1978) .

Indeed,

in

attempting

to

retract

his

stipulation that P5 and P15 remained open for acceptance until May
30th, Appellant construes a rejection of the same, not from the
statements made by Trees, but rather from Trees' uncommunicated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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thoughts.
through

AB
June

at

8.

12th

Appellant's

of

reaffirming the offer.

1981,
3jd.

counsel

Lewis

was

then

states

probably

that

up

disposed

to

This, however, controverts the trial

court finding that after May 27th, Lewis had no intent to close,
despite any effort made by Trees.

Supra at 16-17.

Indeed, both

parties conceded that during the period for closing Trees begged
Lewis what else Lewis desired in order to close, and that Lewis'
response was stony silence.
Appellant

testified

that

Supra at 18-19.
this

promise that Appellant would
stubborn foe.

fulfilled

give Trees

a hard

an

earlier

time and be a

Supra at 15-16; 2DWL at 125.

Ultimately,
Point

behavior

Characteristically,

I claims

that

despite

parole

Respondent

was

clarification,
required

to

Appellant's

state

he

was

accepting a "counteroffer" or the "contract" as amended by Lewis.
AB

at

10.

Through

May

29th,

1981, however,

the

terminology

universally employed by Appellant in referring to P5 and P15 was
"the option".

See F27.

"counteroffer"

was

not

Indeed, Appellant testified that the word
one

either

Mr.

Trees

or

himself

had

employed, but rather one first suggested to him by his counsel two
weeks later on June 12th, 1981.
Lastly,

Appellant

(2DWL at 87, 109)

incongruously

argues

silence constituted an oral rejection of P5 and P15.

that

Trees'

Trees tried

to close several times, however, and specifically pled with Lewis
what else was necessary to close the parties' contract.
18.

Supra at

During this time, Appellant, not Respondent, remained rigidly

silent.

Indeed, the only information Trees got was that Lewis'

attorney, Mr. Bell, was unhappy with P15.

Supra at 19-20.
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POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS THAT
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES;
THESE CONTENTIONS ARE BOTTOMED ON PROPOSALS DRAFTED BY A
NON-PARTY DURING SETTLEMENT AND ORALLY ENCOURAGED AND
ACCEPTED BY THE APPELLANT HIMSELF; THESE PROPOSALS DID
NOT CONSTITUTE THE INTENT OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
RESPONDENT ON MAY 29TH, 1981
Appellant's second point on appeal argues that P28 and
P29, when compared to P15, evidence a failure of the parties'
minds to meet.

Appellant's argument is sterile, however, and

contrary to the following facts.

First, in early June of 1981,

during the period for closing P5 and P15, Lewis told both Milne
and

Trees

that

acceptable.
together

his

attorney,

T188, 191, 233.

and

drafted

P28

Mr.

Bell,

did

not

find

P15

As a result, Lewis and Milne got
and

P29,

with

Lewis

ultimately

instructing Milne to have the documents signed by Respondent and
then forwarded to Lewis' attorney.
thinking

that

Lewis

desired

it

T192, 209.
of

him.

Trees did this

T192-93,

208-11.

Secondly, Trees testified P28 and P29 did not set forth his
understanding of the parties' visitation agreement on May 29th,
1981.
the

Thus, although the agreements were within the context of
parties'

understanding,

Trees

clarified

understanding was more accurately set forth by P15.
211.

that

this

T188, 206,

Clearly, on the date of exercise Trees' understanding and

intent was to accept both P5 and P15. T188, 206-07.

Thirdly, the

trial court, on the basis of uncontroverted testimony, similarly
found that P28 and P29 were not binding on Trees, but formed a
portion of settlement negotiations, and were inadmissible pursuant
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to Rules 52 and 45 of the then applicable Utah Rules of Evidence.
T195-96, 226, 402-07, 409-11.
In light of the above, Appellant's assertions that P28
and P29, drafted by Milne with Lewis' concurrence weeks after
Trees' exercise, somehow reflected Trees' intent on May 29th, 1981
are incredible.

It is incongruous that Lewis should now compare

these documents

to P15, the document

accepted by Trees, and

suggest this belated comparison reflects Trees' state of mind on
May 29th, 1981.

Trees' testimony as to his acceptance of P15 as

clearly defining the visitation agreement never varied throughout
trial.

Indeed, as found by the trial court, Respondent has never

withdrawn his tendered acceptance of both P5 and P15 without
alteration and modification.

See F44.

Ultimately, by reason of

the parties' stipulation that P15 set forth their visitation
agreement, as bolstered by the testimony of both, the trial court
held

that P15

rights.

accurately

set

forth

Lewis' agreed

visitation

And, as both P5 and P15 were extended to May 30th, 1981,

these documents comprise the substance of the only offer, option,
or counteroffer then chargeable to Lewis as seller, regarding
which Trees had an opportunity to accept or exercise on May 29th,
1981.

See POINT II, supra.
POINT IV

APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO OMITTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE
INAPPOSITE; SUCH JURY INSTRUCTIONS EITHER MISSTATE THE
LAW OR ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE OR WERE
SUFFICIENTLY COVERED BY OTHER INSTRUCTIONS
In Point III of Appellant's brief, he indicates that the
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that an offer or
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counteroffer is terminated by a communicated rejection, and cannot
be subject to a later acceptance.

Appellant's theorizes that

Trees orally rejected Lewis' proposal on May 27th, 1981, and thus
terminated the same.
As
instructions

.

previously
neither

set

forth,

conform

to

stipulations, nor Utah case law.

however,

the

these

facts,

the

jury

parties'

First, Appellant's version of

the May 27th, 1981 conversation selectively omits testimony from
both parties that Trees ended the conversation pledging to honor
all commitments made to Lewis, and immediately phoned Hatch at
Lewis' request.
instruction,

Supra at 15-17.

indicating

that

any

Secondly, Appellant's desired
outstanding

proposals

were

terminated by the May 27th, 1981 conversation, is inimical to a
joint stipulation.

This stipulation provides that regardless of

the nomenclature of P5 and P15, the same were open for Trees'
acceptance

through May

30th,

1981.

Supra

at

10-11.

Simply

stated, Appellant's suggestion that these instructions would have
eliminated any need for the jury to consider the efficaciousness
of Trees' timely May 29th letter of exercise, P24, are directly
contrary to an accepted stipulation.

Id.., cjf. AB at 13. Thirdly,

beyond the parties' stipulation, Appellant conceded that P5 and
P15 were held open to May 30th, 1981 by consideration.

This

consisted of both Trees' tender of $1,500 and his continuing and
ultimately successful negotiations for the DeMille purchase.

As

discussed in J. R. Stone Company, Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285
(Utah 1978), offers supported by consideration are not terminated
prior

to the agreed

time by noncompliant

tenders.
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Appellant

attempts to construe a May 27th, 1981 oral conversation as akin to
a rejection of P5 and P15.

Appellant's theory and interpretation,

however,

the

are

contrary

to

facts, the

stipulations

parties, and indeed the applicable Utah case law.

of

the

Appellant's

instructions based thereon were properly omitted, and contrary to
the jury's specific finding that Respondent accepted both P5 and
P15 on May 29th, 1981.

See F39, 40.

t

In the second portion of Point III of Appellant's brief,
he objects to the trial court's failure to give a specific legal
instruction relative to the Statute of Frauds.
instructions drafted

by

The actual jury

the court after extensive

with both counsel appear in the record at R3, 289.

consultation
Instruction

No. 22 formulated by the trial court specifically instructed the
advisory jury, inter alia, as follows:
The acceptance of a counteroffer would require the
signature of the party who accepts same, or his duly
authorized agent, and such party would be bound in all
respects by the terms of such counteroffer.
In this
case the party to accept the counteroffer, if any you so
find, would be James F. Trees. R3 at 321.
The court also instructed the jurors that an offer in writing to
perform (tender) is equivalent to actual performance if all other
respects of the offer are in accord with the parties' agreement.
R3 at 317.
Secondly, the Statute of Frauds was fully complied with,
as both

P5

and

P15 were

extended

by

Lewis, the party

to

be

charged, and by P24 Trees also accepted and signed those documents
by integration.

Supra at POINT II.
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Appellant then contends that Trees did not agree that
the visitation rights be put in writing.
support in the record.

This statement has no

Trees was ready, willing and able to close

and come to Utah to physically sign P15 during June, 1981, the
contractual closing period.
refused

to close.

evidence Appellant's

As

Supra at 18-19.

finally

Lewis, not Trees,

closed, the recorded

rights of retained visitation.

documents
P59, 60,

Supp. Record, 6/84.
Appellant's objections to the jury instructions

further-

fail to comply with Rule 51, U.R.C.P., as discussed in Beehive
Medical Electronics v. Square D Company, 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983).
Also, Appellant

has

failed

to

set

forth wherein

all of the

instructions read in harmony fail to fairly present in a clear and
understandable way the issues of fact and applicable law in the
instant case.

See, e.g. , Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 at 175

(Utah 1983) .
Ultimately, compliance with the Statute of Frauds is a
legal issue, and though fairly presented to the advisory jury, and
clearly complied with by Trees, the issue need not have been
presented to the advisory jury at all.

Simply stated, Appellant

is not entitled to a jury trial of any issue as a matter of right
in a case predominantly

equitable in nature.

Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981).

See Coleman v.

The jury was appropriately

instructed pertaining to Respondent's required written acceptance.
Respondent, by an integrated acceptance, complied with the Statute
of Frauds. There is no reversible error.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

POINT V
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED P28 AND P29 PURSUANT TO
RULES 45 AND 52 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In his Point IV, Appellant argues the admissibility of
P28

and

statement

P29, alleging
that

he

had

that

they

always

contradict Trees1

directly

been

willing

to

accept

P15.

Appellant states that P28 and P29, being signed by Trees, bound
him, and that he never represented that these did not represent
his point of view.

Respondent refers this Court to Point III,

supra, insofar as P28 and P29 comprised proposals drafted by Milne
in consultation with Appellant and submitted to Trees with the
indication that if Trees signed, this case would be settled.
Trees

testified

that

while

these

documents

approximated

the

parties' visitation agreement, PI5 was what Trees understood and
exercised his acceptance on May 29th, 1981.

Supra at 29-31.

Indeed, P28 and P29 not even in existence at that time!
The

trial court, after

extensive

hearings, excluded

these exhibits by reason of both Rules 45 and 52 of the then
applicable Utah Rules of Evidence.

T386-411. Clearly, under Rule

52 these offers of compromise suggested by Lewis and signed by
Trees at Lewis' request should not be used to indicate Trees'
state of mind three weeks prior thereto.
Annot., 26 ALR 2d 878; 15 ALR 3d 13.

Rule 52, URE; see also

Alternatively, even were

such documents admissible for some limited purpose, the trial
court further found that their probative value was substantially
outweighed by the potential consumption of time and misleading of
the jury that their introduction may well have caused.
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T409-11.

In this regard, Appellant has not demonstrated in any way where
the trial court abused its discretion and that injustice resulted
therefrom.

Absent this additional showing, Appellant's arguments

must likewise be rejected.

See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942

(Utah 1982).
POINT VI
ATTORNEY SNOW1S TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE; THERE WAS NO
SURPRISE TO APPELLANT
In Point V of Appellant's brief he argues that the trial
court

erred

in

permitting

the

"surprise

waiver"

of

the

attorney-client relationship by allowing attorney Snow to testify
at trial.

The argument

that the court erred

in allowing

such

testimony fails on at least three grounds.
A.

There was no surprise to Appellant.

Appellant took Snow's deposition on October 28th, 1981.
As Trees was in New York, Snow, without instruction from Trees,
was instructed by Snow's acting counsel, Hughes, to invoke the
privilege.

When Snow's remaining a witness became evident, Trees

retained Hughes and clearly stated his position that regardless of
the nomenclature of P5 and P15, the same had been accepted.

See

RI at 83, liS 58(B) and 59: see also F19.
Affidavits of both attorney Thompson and attorney Hughes
indicate that Jim Trees first waived his attorney-client privilege
at his deposition November 20th, 1981.
Deposition

of

James

Frederick

Trees

See R3 at 193; R4 at 21;
[hereinafter

JFT]

at 133.

Additionally, every pretrial order submitted by either party in
this

case

lists

Steven

E. Snow

as

a witness.

At
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a

pretrial

conference

in December

of

1982, Respondent's

counsel

disclosed

that Mr. Trees would be waiving his attorney-client privilege.
Appellant's counsel then indicated that he would like to redepose
Mr. Snow, and as a result the court specifically left discovery
open until January

10th, 1983 for that purpose.

24-26; R3 at 318-22.
this

opportunity.

R4 at

21-22,

Appellant's counsel never availed himself of
Finally

on

the day

previous

to Mr.

Snow's

taking the witness stand, both of Respondent's counsel approached
Appellant's

counsel

opportunity

to

testimony.

with

Mr.

interview

and

Snow

to

discuss

afford

with

Mr.

Snow

Bell

the

the

latter's

Id., see also T341.

Appellant's reliance on Phipps v. Sasser, 445 P.2d 624
(Wash.

1968)

is

misplaced.

Indeed,

Phipps

holds

that

the

timeliness of waiver of privilege cannot be determined by some
specific point in time applicable to every case.

The Phipps Court

then added that the mere listing of a privileged witness on a
pretrial

order

discovery.

waives

deposition of Snow.
On

opportunity.
same,

but

privilege

and

subjects

him

to

open

Judge Burns left discovery open through January 10th

of 1983, specifically

declined.

the

to allow Mr. Bell to take an additional

R3 at 318-22; R4 at 21-22, 24-26.

appeal

he

AB at 20.

not

having

now

claims

he

was

never

Mr. Bell

given

this

Not only was attorney Bell given the

taken

it, Respondent's

counsel

reviewed

Snow's testimony privately with Bell prior to Snow's taking the
witness stand.

There was no surprise.

B.
Appellant's
testimony at trial.

counsel

opened

the

door
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to

Snow's

The

testimony

of

Trees'

and

Snow's

conversations

regarding P24 now objectionable to Appellant were first elicited
by Appellant's own cross-examination of Trees.
T141-42, 211-13, 238, 242-43.

AB at 15; but see

Ultimately, Snow took the witness

stand only to confirm Trees1 specific earlier testimony elicited
on Mr. Bell's cross-examination.

Furthermore, in the early stages

of trial Mr. Bell's only objection to Snow's testimony was that it
was either heresay or that the questioning itself was suggestive.
See T238, 337.

Indeed, Mr. Bell's statement in reference to these

conversations during trial is telling:
Mr. Bell:

Your Honor, this is a very critical area, and
there were many discussions that day on May
28th, and we've had a let to talk about, and
I'd like this witness [Mr. Snow] to testify
to as what he remembers and not have any
suggestions. T334-35.

These May 28th conversations directly evidenced Trees'
intent when exercising the contract in his letter and tender of
May

29th.

P24,

25.

Trees

drafted

P24

conversations Jield the previous day with Snow.

relying

on

these

Although initially

elicited by Bell, it was only after all of the material testimony
had come

in that Bell, finding the testimony damaging, claimed

that he had been surprised.

T339-40.

As Appellant's counsel was first to broach the subject
of

conversations

held

trial, he is presently
thereto on appeal.

between

Trees

precluded

and

his

prior

from asserting

any

counsel

at

objections

Having opened the door to this testimony, it

is incongruous that after it is received the Appellant now objects
to it.

See Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 18254, filed
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April 12th, 1984, IIC; Legler Construction Inc. v. Roberts Inc.,
550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976).
C.
Appellant waived any objection to Snow's testimony
by his failure to adhere to Utah's contemporaneous objection rule.
As set forth in Point VI B, supra, Appellant's first
objection to Snow's testimony, and indeed Trees' testimony as to
Snow's statements to him, came well after such testimony was
introduced.
counsel

Having opened the door to such testimony, Appellant's

initially

objected

to

the

same

in

only

two

limited

instances as being either heresay or responsive to suggestive
questioning.

T238, 337.

His first objection claiming a surprise

waiver of the privilege was not only untimely but well after the
subject had been completely broached by both sides, and indeed,
even after Appellant's counsel had indicated he desired to hear
Mr. Snow's testimony.

See T334-39.

As a result of counsel's

failure to contemporaneously object at trial, this issue must not
now be considered on appeal.

See, Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons,

Inc., No. 18254, filed April 12th, 1984 at Point IIB.
POINT VII
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE LOWER COURT'S AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S TEES IS CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW
The trial court, after extensive testimony, entered a
series

of

Respondent.

findings

awarding

T698-729; F58-63.

attorney's

fees

of

$45,000

to

Appellant does not specifically

assail any of these findings, but rather asks this Court to simply
speculate that such fees were unreasonable.

Beyond the testimony

proffered at trial and the contractual basis for attorney's fees,
a perusal of the file reveals that the case was extensive.
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At

least eight lengthy depositions were taken, yet only two were
noticed by Respondent.

Several pretrials were conducted and/or

continued, and the matter, at Appellant's request, was ultimately
tried

before

an

advisory

jury

for

four

days.

Post-judgment

motions primarily filed by Appellant were scheduled throughout the
spring of 1983, so that the judgment was not executed until May of
1983, more than three months after trial.

R3 at 28.

Further

arguments additionally setting forth the basis for the fees were
also submitted to the trial court in extensive memoranda.

R3 at

90-106, 283-300.
Clearly, the trial court had the discretion to make the
award; it approximates 55% of that to which Respondent's counsel
testified.
No.

19450,

See Appliance and Heating Supply, Inc. vs. Telaroli,
filed

May

14th,

1984.

Indeed,

the

award

is

substantially less than the monies expended by Respondent in this
matter.
appeal.

Respondent is further entitled to attorney's fees on
Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391 (Utah 1984).
POINT VIII

THE TRIAL COURT'S SUBMISSION OF INTERROGATORY NO. 5 TO
THE JURY IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR
In Point VII of his brief, Appellant argues that the
submission of Interrogatory No. 5 to the jury was prejudicial and
confusing.
defend

A3 at 21-22.

District court judges are rarely able to

their decisions on appeal.

In this case, however, a

dialogue between Appellant's counsel and the District Court Judge
is telling:
The Court:

You should keep in mind that the jury is an
advisory jury and the Court submitted those
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interrogatories to the jury. And the record
should show that the language of the last
interrogatory [interrogatory no. 5] was
changed and tailored specifically at the
request of counsel for the defendant
[appellant] as the Court was approaching the
bench to instruct the jury, and that the
trial court executive made the changes while
the Court was on the bench, consistent with
the language desired by Mr. Bell. . . All
right, Mr. Bell, correct me if I am in
error, when we were in chambers settling at
least any palpable error in the jury
instructions, as proposed, and interrogatories, in chambers, the Court excused
counsel and I put my robe on and started
out, and after I left my chambers, but while
waining [sic] between chambers and the
courtroom, you asked, with Mr. Hughes and
Mr. Thompson, to confer with the Court with
respect to changing some of the language in
that fifth interrogatory. The Court
listened to it, and I didn't agree with it,
but both counsel indicated they wanted that
change . . .Mr. Bell, do I misstate that?
Mr. Bell:
On

No.

T 4/1/83 at 29-31.

appeal Mr. Bell

incongruously

contends

that the

giving of the jury instruction he urged the court to submit to the
jury now constitutes reversible error I

Any error which may be

perceived by this Court, however, has been previously waived by
Mr. Bell's own actions.

Indeed, as Appellant's counsel suggested

that the instruction be given, it can hardly be gainsaid that the
trial

court

did

not

abuse

instruction to the jury.

its discretion

in

submitting

the

Absent abuse, the interrogatory should

not disturb the jury verdict.

See E. A. Strout Western Realty

Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983).
Furthermore, not only was the instruction given within the broad
discretion

of

the

trial

court, in

light

of

the
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answers

to

interrogatories

3 and

4, the

submission

of

constitutes little more than harmless error.

instruction

no. 5

F 39-40.

POINT IX
SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Specific

performance

as

a

remedy

is

not

rigidly

doctrinaire in nature; its burden^ and standards of proof should
be invoked only to protect from injustice, and not as a weapon
with which to perpetrate an injustice.
Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970).

See Kier v. Condrack, 25

Contracts need not provide for

every collateral matter or possible contingency to be specifically
performed.

See Nixon and Nixon, Inc. v. John New and Associates,

641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982).
Court

has

held

that

Dealing with written instruments, this

realty

contracts,

like

others, should

be

construed as a whole, and that potential diverse interpretations
thereof

do

not

Hinkle, 611 P.2d
specific

render
733

performance

proposition

the

same

unenforceable.

See

Jones

v.

(Utah 1980).

Ultimately, the granting of

must

be

always

tempered

by

the

firm

...

that the parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in
good faith to cooperate in performing the contract in
accordance with its expressed intent. . . Quite beyond
this, one party to a contract cannot by willful act or
omission make it impossible or difficult for the other
to perform and then invoke the other's non-performance
as a defense. Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah
1979) .
As stated by the Ferris Court, being an equitable remedy,
[t]he trial court has considerable
discretion
in
determining whether equity and good conscience require
that . . . [specific performance] be granted. Id., at
859.
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The following comprise alternative grounds sustaining the advisory
jury and trial court decision.
A.

Statutory Tender.

The trial court found on substantial evidence that from
and after May 27th, 1981 there was no performance which Trees
might have tendered upon which Appellant would have closed on the
parties' transaction.

Supra at 16-17.

As suchf tender by Trees

under Utah law as a condition precedent to specific performance
would be legally unnecessary.
1152

See Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d

(Utah 1976); Thomas v. Johnson, 55 Utah 424, 186 P. 437

(1919) .
regardless

In the
of

instant

case, both

parties

its nomenclature, Trees1

stipulated

opportunity

that,

to accept

Appellant's proposal extended through May 30th, 1981 and that the
manner of acceptance was governed by paragraph 5 of P5.

Supra at

10-11; see also F10, 23. On May 29th, 1981, Respondent made such
a

tender,

Appellant.

and

the

same

was

received

P24, 25; supra at 17-18.

shortly

thereafter

by

Appellant held this tender

for over two weeks without comment, and remained silent even after
Trees begged him what else was necessary in order to close. Supra
at

18-19.

defective.

Respondent

never

specified

where

the

tender

was

Ixi.; F49-51, 53. Under Utah law, the person to whom a

tender is made must, at the time, specify any objections he may
have to it or they are waived.

Respondent waived any objections.

§78-27-3, UCA, 1953; 74 AmJur2d, "Tender" §10; see also Hansen v.
Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976) and Hackford v. Snow, 657
P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) n. 7.
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B.

Contractual Tender.

In Timpanogas Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481
(Utah 1975) , the Utah Supreme Court held that usually one who
refuses

a

tender

should

state

the

basis

of

his

refusal.

Construing the material terms of the parties' agreement, paragraph
11 of P5 would clearly have required Appellant, acting in good
faith, to have specified in writing any objection he may have had
to Trees' tender, and allowed an opportunity for Trees to cure.
See Fll, 53. This Appellant chose not to do, as he knew full well
that Trees' clear intention was to complete the transaction, and
indeed do anything Appellant requested in order to close.
at 18-19.

Supra

Indeed, in light of Trees' substantial compliance with

all the terms of the parties' agreement, employing those phrases
used by Appellant himself, Lewis' unilateral renegging on their
contract alone justified the trial court's decision.

See F19, 27,

43, 45, 51; see also Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 at 1297
(Utah 1982) .
C.

Good Faith.

The lead Utah case regarding good faith is Ferris v.
Jennings, supra.

In Ferris, a real estate agent, by mere silence,

attempted to frustrate a contract by failing to set forth, despite
repeated requests, the amount of a "fair commission" which he was
to receive from an oral contract to convey real estate.

Mr.

Bell's client here acted no differently than did the agent in
Ferris.

Thus, despite Trees' repeated pleadings during the period

of close as to what additional performance would satisfy Lewis,
Lewis

responded

with

little

more

than

characteristic
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stony

silence, or statements to the effect that he had simply "lost
faith" in the transaction.
had

lost was good

Supra at 18-19.

faith.

Although

The only faith Lewis

unnecessary

to the trial

court's decision, when Appellant's counsel specifically requested
a finding that his client had not acted in bad faith, the trial
court denied the same. T 4/14/83 at 11.
D.

Estoppel.

Appellant in this case committed to Respondent that his
"option" was open for acceptance through May 30th of 1981.

In

exchange for that promise, Lewis requested that Trees first be
able to close on the DeMille transaction, a piece of property
which Appellant concedes was little more than a pile of rocks.
Supra at 3; P23.

In reliance thereon, Respondent committed to

purchasing the DeMille property on May 26th, 1981.
uncontroverted

that the

final purchase price

F31.

for the DeMille

parcel was substantially in excess of its real value.
14.

It was

Appellant is estopped from denying the contract.

Supra at
See Morgan

v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976); and J. P. Koch,
Inc. v. J. C. Penney Company, Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975).
E.

Frustration of Contract.

Respondent incorporates the facts and law in Point IX
A-D, supra.

Clearly, Appellant, otherwise imposed with a duty,

should not be entitled by his willful acts or omissions, to make
it impossible or difficult for Trees to perform and then argue
that Trees' alleged failure to perform is a defense to specific
performance.

Lewis simply refused to close, never stating why.

See Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 at 859 (Utah 1979).
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F.

Part-Performance.
(1)

Before

trial—Historically

to

either

remove

oral contracts from the Statute of Frauds or overcome allegations
of indefiniteness, part-performance

has generally required

both

occupation and improvement of real estate.

Nonetheless, a line of

Utah

detriment

cases

have

held

that

economic

alone,

if

specifically tied to the contract, is sufficient to satisfy the
doctrine.

See, e.g., LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 26

Utah 2d 158, 486 P.2d 1040 (1971); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust
Company, 6 Utah

2d 18, 305 P.2d

480

(1956); and Van Natta v.

Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920).

In the instant case on

April 25, 1981, Appellant specifically conditioned Trees' ability
to accept the "option" on Trees first being "able to acquire the
DeMille

property".

P23.

In

fulfilling

Appellant's

request,

Respondent committed $846,000 to be able to purchase the DeMille
property, over $230,000 in excess of its value.
Trees' May

26, 1981 commitment

to purchase

P58, T136-38.

the DeMille

parcel

alone constitutes part-performance.
(2)
has

peacefully

improvements

After trial—As set forth supra at 21, Trees

occupied

thereon

filing of this brief.

the

property

and

made

substantial

for well over a year at the time of the
He has, furthermore, tendered two checks to

the Appellant which Appellant cashed.

No supersedeas bond has

been

historic

filed.

Thus,

part-performance,

even

Trees

under

has

improvements on the ground.

a

occupied

and

viewpoint

made

of

substantial

Coupled with the checks tendered in

compliance with the court-ordered decree of specific performance,
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a reversal would now require a peaceful occupant to vacate against
his will property he purchased and has improved.

A reversal would

further, of necessity, require Appellant to return those monies to
Respondent which

he has

specific performance.

accepted

pursuant

to

the

decree of

Consequently, a reversal would contravene

the behavior of both parties undertaken, from all appearances, in
total conformity with the trial court's decree.
G.

Breach of Contract.

Appellant has never complied with paragraph 11 of P5.
See also subsection IX B, supra.
H.

Reformation.

On the basis of the evidence proffered at trial and
recited supra at 2-21, were there any problems in the language to
be contained in the deed and mortgage, the trial court in an
equity case would be empowered to reform such documents to conform
to the parties1 agreement, where to do otherwise would result in
an injustice.
1984.

See Mabey v. Peterson, No. 18338, filed April 24th,

Clearly, P59 and 60, as executed pursuant to the trial

court's decree of specific performance, conform exactly to what
both parties intended in the instant case.

Supp. Record 6/84.

Indeed, pursuant to such exhibits, Respondent has occupied the
subject property and Appellant has received and cashed checks
tendered

in conformity

with

the mortgage

original of which was mailed to Appellant.

note, the

R4 at 36-37, 42-43.
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executed

POINT X
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO AN APPEAL
After trial and pursuant to the decree of specific
performance, Appellant

voluntarily

vacated

the

subject matter

property and Respondent moved to the ranch on or about June 17th,
1983.

See P59, 60; see also supra at 21.

The original mortgage

note has been tendered to Appellant with two checks totalling
$70,000 in conformity to the decree of specific performance.

The

first check was a cashier's check and the second a personal check;
neither had any restrictive
tender.

Id.

language on them at the time of

Appellant cashed both checks on September 9th, 1983,

indicating on the reverse side his intent to obtain interest
thereon pending the outcome in this appeal.

Respondent contends

that Appellant's acceptance of the checks and retention of these
monies constitutes a waiver of Appellant's right to appeal the
decree of specific performance which entitled Appellant to the
checks in the first place.

Respondent earlier

unsuccessfully

moved to dismiss this appeal, but the argument was reserved for
plenary appeal.

Thereafter, Appellant belatedly sought a Court

order sanctioning his cashing the checks or otherwise allowing him
to return the monies to Respondent, arguing that he had now become
a self-appointed trustee.

This order was denied.

By a vast majority of precedent,
[a] party who accepts benefits under a judgment waives
his rights to appeal with the actual intent of the party
pertaining to that right of appeal as a general rule
being 'immaterial1. See 4 AmJur2d, "Appeal and Error",
§250; see also 169 ALR at 1056.
Appellant's effort to return or tender back these monies is of no
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avail to restore the rights lost.

See 4 AmJur2d, "Appeal and

Error", §251; see also 169 ALR 1057. Thus, in Sierra Nevada Mill
Company v. Keith O'Brien Company, 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916),
Chief Justice Straup indicated that where the receipt of benefits
under a contract is indivisible from the validity thereof, their
receipt barred further prosecution of an appeal challenging the
contract.
In Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Company, 56
Utah 190, 188 P. 1117, 1118

(1920), Justice Frick stated the

applicable rule as follows:
It is elementary that in case a party to an action
accepts the benefits of a judgment in his favor or
acquiesces in a judgment against him, he thereby waives
his right to have such judgment reviewed on appeal.
In Ottenheimer the lessee appealed a termination of his lease.
Subsequent

to

premises.

As

reaffirmation

trial, however, he voluntarily
the
of

lessee's

the

lease,

issues
by

on

surrendered

appeal

voluntarily

all

the

sought

abandoning

the

property, the Court concluded that regardless of the lessee's
subjective intent, his behavior, nonetheless, objectively required
a waiver of the litigated questions, precluding appellate review.
See also Cornia v. Cornia, 15 P.2d 631 (Utah 1932).
In Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (Utah
1973), the Utah Supreme Court considered an appeal, despite the
Appellant's acceptance of monies.

In so holding, however, the

Jensen court specifically found that the parts of the judgment
appealed from were separate and distinct from the ruling upon
which the payments had been conditioned.

See 30 Utah 2d at 157.
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In the instant case, however, Appellant's right to receive monies
is directly

related

performance.
distinction

The
noted

to

the

Jensen
by

judgment

case

Chief

was

Justice

and

decree

cited
Hall

of

favorably

specific
and

this

in Hollingsworth

v.

Farmers Insurance Company, 655 P.2d 637 (Utah 1982).
The fact that not all the payments have been made is of
no consequence, insofar as they are being timely made as required
by the decree.

Appellant's acceptance of substantial benefits in

excess of $70,000, and his retention of the note alone are clearly
sufficient.

See 4 CJS, "Appeal

and Error", §215

at 644-45.

Furthermore, were Appellant to argue that he cashed the check so
that at least someone could obtain interest thereon, or that
otherwise he might be denied interest on the sale by the appellate
process, this argument, at least as to Trees' personal check for
$35,000, is unfounded.

Personal checks, otherwise uncashed, do

not terminate interest to a seller in a judicial setting.

See

Pack v. Hull Development Company Inc., 667 P.2d 39 (Utah 1983).
Thus, had the personal check remained uncashed, interest would
still be

imposed

Appellant.

on Respondent's purchase

price in favor of

Id.., see also Le Vine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109

P. 2 (1910).
Appellant voluntarily chose to cash these checks.

He

retains, either personally or through his attorney, the original
mortgage

note

performance.

tendered

according

He has vacated

supersedeas bond.

to

the

decree

the property.

of

specific

He has

filed no

Yet he seeks an appellate reversal which would

now require Trees to vacate the property and accept his money back
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on a draft prepared by Appellant.

Clearly, this Court should not

entertain an appeal contrary to the simple thrust of all of Lewis1
affirmative acts.
CROSS-APPEAL
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR DAMAGES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
In the event this Court reverses the decree of specific
performance, Respondent contends that the trial court erred in
finding that Respondent had failed to present a prima facie case
for damages in the alternative to specific performance.

Clearly,

Appellant was well aware that in compelling Trees to be able to
purchase

the

DeMille

property,

he

was

in

effect

compelling

Respondent to negotiate the purchase a pile of rocks at a greatly
inflated price.

Supra at POINT IX F(2).

Conversations throughout

the spring of 1981 were held between Respondent and Appellant, and
Appellant was well aware that the DeMilles had been both difficult
to deal with and worthy foes in Trees1 negotiations with them.
Having clearly placed Trees in the position where, by personal,
legal and moral commitments he was required to close with the
DeMilles,

if

this

Court

reverses

the

decree

of

specific

performance, then the Court should also remand the matter so that
the legal issue of Trees1 damages may be appropriately determined
by the jury.

Indeed, insofar as the trial court dismissed this

portion of Respondent's case without submission to the jury, the
standards of appellate review favor reversal, and every inference
should be construed in Trees' favor.

Of course, this cross-appeal
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is material

only

in

the

event

that

the decree

of

specific

performance is not affirmed on any of the many available grounds.
CONCLUSION
The jury verdict and trial court's judgment should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of June, 1984.

IAEL
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the
mailed

a true

and

correct

copy

of

day of July, 1984, I
the

above

and

foregoing

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL to J. Richard Bell, attorney
for Appellant, at 303 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84115, postage prepaid.
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